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Numerical Quantification and Temporal Intervals: 
A Span-er in the Works for Presentism? 
 
Abstract: 
 
Arthur Prior states that ‗It will be/was/is that p‘ is true iff ‗p‘ will be/was/is true, and that is all 
that needs to be said about the matter. This appears to avoid any need to invoke the existence of 
non-present entities and accounts for tensed truths with very little ontological cost. However, as 
David Lewis notes, this version of presentism gives the wrong results when applied to 
numerically quantified tensed propositions. I show how presentism can accommodate numerical 
quantification by introducing a more appropriate tense operator. Further, I argue that it is 
implausible to think that we can have a primitive understanding of it; the correct semantics 
involves quantification over past and future times. I go on to show what kind of ontology can 
complement this semantic story, whilst remaining presentist in nature.   
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 2 
Numerical Quantification and Temporal Intervals: 
A Span-er in the Works for Presentism? 
 
In Time and Modality, Prior states that the truth-conditions for both modal and tensed statements 
have the following form (F): 
 
(F) ‗It will be/was/could be that p‘ is true iff ‗p‘ will be/was/could be true.1 
 
For example, the past-tensed statement ‗There was some toe-sucking afoot‘ is true iff the present-
tensed statement ‗There is some toe-sucking afoot‘ was true. We can notate tensed statements 
using the tense operators P, N and F (read ‗It was the case that‘, ‗It is (now) the case that‘, and ‗It 
will be the case that‘, respectively) operating on present-tensed propositions, and can notate 
modal statements using the modal operator  (read ‗It could be the case that‘) operating on 
indicative propositions, and write the truth-conditions thus: 
 
(1) ‗Pp‘ is true iff ‗p‘ was true. 
(2) ‗Np‘ is true iff ‗p‘ is true 
(3) ‗Fp‘ is true iff ‗p‘ will be true 
(4) ‗ p‘ is true iff ‗p‘ could be true 
 
Complex tenses can be notated by iterating these basic tenses, and it is easy to see how 
they fit into the above scheme. For instance, ‗FPp‘ is true iff ‗Pp‘ will be true, where ‗―Pp‖ will 
be true‘ is true iff ‗―p‖ was true‘ will be true. We can also establish more precisely when ‗p‘ is 
true by introducing metric tense operators which indicate not just that something was the case, as 
P does, but when it was the case.
2
 For example, if the basic unit of time is an hour, ‗There was 
some toe-sucking three hours ago‘ can be written ‗P3p‘. Prior comments on (1)-(4) that ‗semantic 
rules of this sort were stated by the schoolmen, and they are after all very simple and obvious‘.3 
But it is one thing giving such obvious semantic rules, and quite another giving an account of 
what appears on the RHS of such biconditionals. Everyone can agree on some given truth-
conditions, yet still disagree over what, if anything, is needed to make such statements true. 
An elegant, transparent, and hence popular account of (1)-(3) is to hold that past-tensed 
statements are now true in virtue of certain concrete facts located earlier than now; present-tensed 
statements are now true in virtue of certain concrete facts located simultaneously with now, and 
future-tensed statements are now true in virtue of certain concrete facts located later than now. 
According to this view, Edgar the Peaceable (c.942-975CE) and Edgar the Atheling (c.1051-
c.1126CE) are as real, as much flesh and blood monarchs of England, as the current one is; it is 
just that they are located at times earlier than the times at which Queen Elizabeth II is located. It 
is, then, the flesh and blood Edgar the Atheling and his attributes that serve to make statements 
about him true.
4
  
                                                 
1
 See Prior (1957: 9) 
2
 Prior (1957: 11-13) 
3
 Prior (1957: 9) 
4
 For early versions of this view, see, for instance, Russell (1915), Broad (1921), Goodman (1951), 
Williams (1951), Quine (1960), Smart (1963), Grünbaum (1967). For later, improved, versions, see, for 
instance, Smart (1980), Mellor (1981) and (1998), Oaklander (1984) and Le Poidevin (1991). McCall 
(1994) and Tooley (1997) also hold this view about the past and present, but Tooley differs in thinking that 
there are no concrete times later than the present, and McCall differs in thinking that, although only one 
concrete future will be actualised, there is more than one concrete future as of the present time (see my 
(2006) for criticisms of Tooley and McCall). 
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 3 
An equally elegant and transparent – but not so popular! – account of (4) is to hold that 
modal statements are true in virtue of certain concrete features of other worlds. Statements 
concerning what I could have done are true in virtue of what I (or rather my equally real, flesh 
and blood counterpart located in another world) does do.
5
 
Prior rejects any need for either of these accounts. He sees no need to go beyond a 
minimal reading of (F), and thus sees no need to invoke the existence of non-present or non-
actual beings. This makes Prior a presentist. But it makes him a presentist of a particular sort. The 
obvious feature of this account is that, since ‗will be/was/could be‘ appear on both sides of the 
biconditional in (F), it does not give us an analysis of the relevant terms. Yet one good thing that 
analyses give us is a clearer idea of what would make such statements true, as we get with the 
accounts mentioned above that explicitly quantify over non-present and non-actual concrete times 
and worlds. On Prior‘s account, however, although we may well know how the present has to be 
in order for ‗There is a king of England named Edgar‘ to be true – we know what the constituents 
of the fact would be, and how it is composed –, we are in left in the dark about what must be the 
case in order for ‗There was a king of England named Edgar‘ to be true. For ‗There was a king of 
England named Edgar‘ is a present truth; but what now can make it true, if the past object Edgar 
no longer exists? Just leaving it as a brute (present) fact that something was the case leaves us 
with too many unanswered questions.
6
 But, of course, this variety of presentist won‘t feel the 
need to answer such questions; so it would be a better strategy for an opponent to find some other 
charge to bring against such a position.
7
  
One such charge surrounds problems with numerical quantification. Take a modal case, 
such as: 
 
(5) There are several ways in which Deep Blue could win this chess game 
 
This is easily dealt with by a defender of the view that there are non-actual possibilia: each of the 
ways in which Deep Blue could have won is a way that some concrete counterpart of it does win; 
so if there are such ways, then (5) is true. Prior‘s truth-conditions, however, go awry. Fitting (5) 
into the form (F) gives: 
 
(5a) ‗There are several ways in which Deep Blue could win this chess game‘ is true iff 
‗There are several ways in which Deep Blue wins this chess game‘ could be true 
 
But since the sentence on the RHS of the biconditional in (5a) could not be true, something is 
amiss with this way of taking the modal operator as primitive. A similar problem with numerical 
quantification occurs for tenses, as Lewis (2004) points out. Consider: 
 
                                                 
5
 See, for instance, Lewis (1986), who calls his view ‗genuine modal realism‘. 
6
 Various options for finding truthmakers in the present for past-tensed statements are discussed and 
rejected in my (2006). 
7
 One charge that I bring against this version of presentism (in my (2006)) is that it fails to guarantee the 
truth-value links between various times, such as that p  FPp. This is a fatal flaw in any theory of time, but 
it is one I shall ignore for our present purposes. What is interesting to note, however, is that the failure to 
guarantee the truth-value links is a consequence of the fact that the primitive facts that presently exist 
concerning what happened and will happen change over time, and because times are distinct entities, it is 
hard to see what guarantees that when the next time comes into existence, its primitive facts will link up 
with what the facts were when the previous time existed. But since modal facts holding at the actual world 
do not change in this way, primitivism about modality avoids this particular objection, and is in a much 
stronger position than primitivism about tense. 
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 4 
(6) There were (exactly) two kings of England named Edgar 
 
and its respective truth-condition according to the form (F): 
 
(6a) ‗There were two kings of England named Edgar‘ is true iff ‗There are two kings of 
England named Edgar‘ was true 
 
i.e., where ‗K‘ means is a king of England named Edgar, iff 
 
(6b) P x y(((Kx & Ky) & x y) & z(Kz  (z=x  z=y))) 
 
The problem with translating (6) as (6b) is that (6) could be true without it ever being that 
 
(6c) x y(((Kx & Ky) & x y) & z(Kz  (z=x  z=y))) 
 
was true at any particular time; indeed, as we have seen, they did not rule at the same time. This 
renders (6) true and (6b) false. 
 Lewis considers various strategies for translating (6) using Prior‘s operators, but 
dismisses them all. We need not go through his arguments here, since, on reflection, this should 
come as no big surprise: Prior‘s tense operators were made only for dealing with statements that 
are true at a particular time, whereas the examples demand an operator capable of spanning 
various times. If presentism is to survive, then, we need to add such an operator to the Priorian 
tense logic. 
Let us introduce such an operator. To make it explicit that it is a past-tense span operator, 
let us notate it as ‗sPan‘. We can then specify the times that it spans in a similar way to the 
ordinary metric tense operators above, as follows: 
 
‗sPan 0‘ is read ‗It was the case during all of the past that‘ 
‗sPan 0‘ is read ‗It will be the case during all of the future that‘8 
‗sPan 0‘ is read ‗It was the case during all of the past, and is the case in the present, that‘ 
‗sPan 0‘ is read ‗It will be the case during all of the future, and is the case in the present, 
that‘ 
 
We can indicate even more specific intervals by notating the superscript as follows: 
 
Open intervals:    ]a, b[  a  n units ago  b 
Closed intervals:   [a, b]  a  n units ago  b 
Half-open (or half-closed) intervals: [a, b[  a  n units ago  b 
      ]a, b]  a  n units ago  b 
 
For example, if we are dealing with units of one year, ‗sPan[2000, 3000[‘ is read ‗It was the case 
during the interval of precisely 2000 years ago up until but not including 3000 years ago that‘. 
With this understanding, presentists can then notate the problematic numerically 
quantified statement (6) as: 
 
(7) sPan
0
(There are two kings of England named Edgar) 
                                                 
8 
We could, of course, introduce a separate operator for the future, but this shows that there is no need for it, 
and, for obvious reasons, the ‗sPan‘ notation is much lovelier than ‗sFan‘.  
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 5 
i.e.,  
 (7a) sPan
0
( x y(((Kx & Ky) & x y) & z(Kz  (z=x  z=y)))) 
 
This no more commits presentism to the existence of the two Edgars than the truth of the more 
standard 
 
(8) P(There is a king of England named Ethelweard) 
 
commits us to the existence of Ethelweard. It looks like presentism can survive, then, if it 
introduces the span operator. 
 Lewis‘s objections to taking span operators as primitive, however, are that ‗they create 
ambiguities even when prefixed to a sentence that is not itself ambiguous‘ (Lewis (2004: 12)), 
such as when prefixed to ‗It is moist and it is turgid‘, which could mean that it is both moist and 
turgid at some time during that interval, or could mean that, during the interval, it is moist during 
one subinterval and turgid during another. A special case of this is where ‗sPan‘ prefixes to 
contradictory sentences, such as ‗It is turgid and it is flaccid‘, to make a truth. In light of these 
features of the operator, Lewis claims that it is so unmanageable that we cannot claim to have a 
primitive understanding of it. 
 It is not clear, however, that it is all that unmanageable. To disambiguate such sentences, 
some presentists may claim that all that has to be said is: 
 
(9) sPan
0
(It is moist & it is turgid) & ~P(It is moist & it is turgid) 
 
If they are right, the upshot is that there is no argument from lack of expressive power against a 
presentist who takes tense operators to be primitive, so long as they include spanners in their 
toolkit. It looks more like, insofar as this issue goes, we have arrived at a stalemate.
9
 
Nevertheless, many of us think that our understanding of a claim like (9) does not 
bottom-out with this bare statement. What grounds our understanding of such operators, not to 
mention our understanding of ‗&‘ within this context? I feel moved to say that our grasp of (9) is 
based in our taking ‗sPan ‘ to mean that there is an interval of time  during which and ‗P‘ to 
mean that there is a past time at which. But since this alternative to taking the operators as 
primitive quantifies over non-present times and intervals, the moral that many will draw is that 
we must either adopt presentism with its primitive operators, or give an account of the operators 
that quantifies over non-present objects and abandon presentism. But drawing that conclusion 
would be hasty: there is middle ground between these two options, since it is possible to be a 
presentist without having to take the operators as primitive.     
The position that I have in mind is analogous to the so-called ‗ersatz modal realism‘, 
which I take to hold the middle ground between Lewis‘s genuine modal realism and Prior‘s 
modal primitivism.
10
 For although such positions give an account (albeit non-reductive) of the 
modal operators in terms of possible worlds, they fall short of committing themselves to non-
actual concrete individuals and worlds. Rather, they give an account of worlds in terms of their 
favoured kinds of abstract object. Thus (5) is just as unproblematic for ersatz modal realists as it 
is for genuine modal realists; the only difference being that each of the ways in which Deep Blue 
could have won is represented not by some concrete object but by some suitable abstract object, 
according to which Deep Blue does win that way. We can treat time similarly. 
                                                 
9
 A similar thing, it seems, can be said in the modal case. Suppose we use ‗span ‘ to span possibilities, then 
we could write: span (There are many ways in which Deep Blue wins the chess match) & ~ (There are 
many ways in which Deep Blue wins the chess match) 
10
 See, for instance, Adams (1974), Plantinga (1976) and Stalnaker (1976) 
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 6 
Although I have given such a treatment of the standard tense operators in my (2006), we 
need to summarise some of the framework here in order to see how the problematic span 
operators can be added to it. 
Let us first introduce the ordered triple T, E, t , where T is a set, E is a relation on T, 
and t T. Intuitively, T is the set of times, E is the ‗earlier than‘ relation, and t is a particular time. 
I take times themselves to be ordered pairs of the form t = , n ,
11
  where  is a set of present-
tensed propositions, and n is a number that represents the date at which those propositions are 
true.
12
 Take  to give a complete representation of what is true at that time. Take E to be a 
relation between such times. To represent that time is linear, for instance, the E-relation will have, 
among others, the properties of being irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive. To represent that 
time is continuous, let n ℝ. The ordering of the times by the E-relation from earlier to later will 
follow the obvious ordering of the dates. 
 Let us also distinguish truth-at-a-time from truth simpliciter.
13
 Truth simpliciter is an 
absolute, not time-relative, notion, whereas truth-at-a-time is time-relative: all propositions at a 
time are true relative to it, but only those propositions which are true at the present time are true 
simpliciter. So, where the propositions involved are any atomic propositions, we have: 
 
(10) ‗p‘ is true-at-a-time T, E, , n ℝ  iff p . 
(11) ‗~p‘ is true-at-a-time T, E, , n ℝ  iff p . 
(12) ‗p&q‘ is true-at-a-time T, E, , n ℝ  iff p, q .14 
 
Whereas, for instance: 
 
(13) ‗Socrates is sitting‘ is true simpliciter iff Socrates (i.e., a concrete, flesh  
and blood Socrates) is presently sitting. 
 
The problem for presentism is that past-tensed propositions cannot be true simpliciter in 
the same way that present-tensed propositions can, since to invoke concrete past objects is to give 
up on presentism. Past-tensed propositions, then, must be treated differently.
15
 I propose the 
following: 
 
(14) ‗Pp‘ is true simpliciter iff p is a member of a set  of present-tense propositions 
that is the first element of an ordered pair , ni ℝ  E-related to the presently 
realised ordered pair , nj ℝ , where  is the set of present-tensed propositions 
that is true simpliciter, and ni < nj. 
 
                                                 
11
 At least for the purposes of this paper. See fn.15 
12
 Both numbers and propositions I take to be abstract objects. 
13
 Analogous to Adams (1974) in distinguishing truth-at-a-world from truth simpliciter 
14
 It should be obvious how to continue for the other truth-functional connectives. 
15
 Future-tensed propositions require much more formal machinery than is required for our purposes here, 
since I take the future to have a branching structure, and so we need to ensure that we choose those times 
along those branches that correspond to what we would ordinarily call the actual history of the world. For 
these niceties, see my (2006). 
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In other words, ‗Pp‘ is true iff ‗p‘ is true at a time earlier than the present time. Quantified 
propositions can be dealt with as follows:
16
  
 
(15) ‗P xFx‘ is true at T, E, t  (and is true simpliciter iff the set of propositions at t is 
true simpliciter) iff xFx is true at some time E-related to t, where xFx is true-
at-a-time T, E, , n ℝ  iff xFx . 
 
(16) ‗P xFx‘ is true at T, E, t  (and is true simpliciter iff the set of propositions at t is 
true simpliciter) iff xFx is true at some time E-related to t, where xFx is true-
at-a-time T, E, , n ℝ  iff xFx .17 
 
The idea, then, is that present-tensed propositions are made true by concrete facts, 
whereas past-tensed propositions are made true by facts concerning appropriately structured 
abstract objects. Presentism should now be thought of not as the view that only one time exists, 
but that only one time has a concrete realisation. Since it is the claim that no times other than the 
present are concrete that matters for being a presentist, presentism should not be characterised as 
the view that ‗only the present exists‘, since presentists qua presentists can believe in much more: 
having a view about time need not commit you to a view about the ontology of mathematics, for 
instance. So the view I am sketching here still counts as presentism.
18
 
We have now arrived at the stage where we can tackle the more complex sPan operator. 
To appreciate the strategy, we should break it down into stages. ‗sPan  p‘ is used to quantify over 
times during the interval , and to say that p is true during it. The time interval  is just a set of E-
related times. So to say that p is true during  is to say that p is a member of the first element of 
some time during . So we have: 
 
(17) ‗sPan  p‘ is true at T, E, t  (and is true simpliciter iff the set of propositions at t 
is true simpliciter) iff p is a member of the first element of some time among 
those times E-related to t that comprise the interval .  
 
It is also straight-forward to formulate truth-conditions for sPan operating on negated 
propositions, as follows: 
 
(18) ‗sPan ~p‘ is true at T, E, t  (and is true simpliciter iff the set of propositions at t 
is true simpliciter) iff p is not a member of the first element of some time among 
those times E-related to t that comprise the interval . 
                                                 
16
 We only need to consider de dicto quantified past-tensed propositions here in order to understand the 
temporal ersatzist position. Although it is commonly thought that presentism cannot deal with de re forms, 
I show how it can in my (2006). 
17
 Note that the existential quantifier, here, is read tenselessly, if only because if it were taken to mean 
presently exists, then presentism would be the trivial thesis that only what presently exists, presently exists. 
Read it tenselessly and it becomes more exciting. The quantifiers should also be read in the standard 
objectual way. The quantified propositions xFx and xFx themselves are to be given their standard truth-
conditions in terms of the satisfaction of the incomplete proposition Fx. Note that the objects that at one 
time satisfy Fx need not remain in existence for a quantified proposition within a tense operator to be true, 
as noted above with (7) and (8).  
18
 Lewis complains that the difference between abstract and concrete is not clear. I think that all that needs 
to be said, however, is that the relations that hold at and between concrete times, such as spatio-temporal 
relations, are entirely different from the sorts of relations that hold at and between abstract times, such as 
entailment and set-membership. 
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This is a nice way of proceeding because (17) and (18) allow for a neat way of expressing the 
idea that p is true during all of the interval , as follows: ~sPan ~p. 
Conjunctions, as we have seen, are not always true at particular times, although they 
could be, so we must say: 
 
(19) ‗sPan (p&q)‘ is true at T, E, t  (and is true simpliciter iff the set of propositions 
at t is true simpliciter) iff p is a member of the first element of some time among 
those times E-related to t that comprise the interval , and q is a member of the 
first element of some time among those times E-related to t that comprise the 
interval .. 
 
The other truth-functional connectives can either be introduced in a similar way, or expressed 
using (17)-(19). The truth-conditions for quantified propositions falling within the sPan operator 
can be given, as follows:
19
 
 
(20) ‗sPan xFx‘ is true at T, E, t  (and is true simpliciter iff the set of propositions at 
t is true simpliciter) iff xFx is a member of the first element of some time 
among those times E-related to t that comprise the interval  
 
(21) ‗sPan xFx‘ is true at T, E, t  (and is true simpliciter iff the set of propositions 
at t is true simpliciter) iff xFx is a member of the first element of some time 
among those times E-related to t that comprise the interval  
 
Temporal intervals, then, seem quite manageable for presentists who treat other times in 
this ersatz way. Is this, then, to say that we now have a simple way of formulating the correct 
truth-conditions (and giving the truthmakers) for our problematic (6)? Unfortunately not, for the 
major problem arises when we introduce identity. Consider the following attempt at formulating 
the simpler ‗There were at least two kings of England‘ using something along the lines of a 
combination of (19) and (20): 
 
(22) ‗sPan x y((Kx & Ky) & x y)‘ is true at T, E, t  (and is true simpliciter iff the 
set of propositions at t is true simpliciter) iff xKx is a member of the first 
element of some time among those times E-related to t that comprise the interval 
, and yKy is a member of the first element of some time among those times E-
related to t that comprise the interval , and x y is a member… 
 
Something has gone wrong. The variables x and y float free in ‗x y‘, and any attempt to bind 
them results in the false claim that these two distinct objects existed at the same time. Another 
attempt might be to place the burden on the intervals themselves and say that either they are 
identical, in which case ‗ x y((Kx & Ky) & x y)‘ can be true at each time during it, or they are 
not identical (from which it may be hoped we could draw conclusions about the identity of x and 
y). But without even attempting to capture the idea that the intervals could partially overlap and 
include the proposition that x y((Kx & Ky) & x y) this strategy, although containing no free 
variables, does not quite capture that there are at least two kings of England: one interval might 
begin when the other ends, and yet there might only ever be what we would take to be one thing 
throughout that satisfies ‗Kx‘ at each time. 
                                                 
19
 See fn.17 
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 The difficulty that presentism has with these cases should not, however, be taken to 
indicate a difficulty with presentism itself. Rather, the real moral we should draw from trying to 
give an analysis is that such cases involve a hidden complexity. What presentists need to do to 
offer a satisfactory solution to the problem, then, is to give a general strategy for dealing with the 
complexity once it has been identified. 
The key to a solution is to note that when claims of identity fall within the scope of a 
span operator it suggests that the identity relation may not be intended synchronically but 
diachronically. Given this, it is no wonder that presentism has no easy way to formulate examples 
such as (6), whereas a realist about other times has no particular difficulty. This is because, for a 
relation to exist, all of its relata must exist; so if the relation is transtemporal, presentists cannot 
believe in them: if one relatum exists, any other non-synchronous relatum does not. In other 
words, this problem is just a special case of a more general problem for presentism, namely how 
to deal with transtemporal relations. Presentists, unlike realists about other times, cannot believe 
that there is a genuine identity relation (or, indeed, difference relation) that holds between relata 
located at different times. But this seems to be what is needed to solve the problem of numerical 
quantification within the sPan operator. So what should a presentist do?  
 We need to say what conditions are required for something to be the same thing over 
time, and for it to be different from everything else. This is, of course, a controversial issue, but 
however we fill in the particular details, we should all agree that whether one thing is the same as 
or different from another thing is something that supervenes on the facts. Of course, this is not 
saying much until we know what the facts are taken to be, but if we can show that such facts need 
not require transtemporal relations, then presentism is home and dry. 
 Let us consider what it takes to be one king of England named Edgar. The natural way of 
understanding this is as invoking an object that lasts for longer than an instant; so one 
requirement is for the proposition that there is one king of England named Edgar to be true at 
particular times during some interval. However, since this is compatible with there having been 
more than one king of England named Edgar during this time, we have to tie together all of the 
things who at particular times during the interval are kings of England named Edgar to form one 
integrated king of England who lasts the duration of the interval. Let us call whatever it is that 
holds between these things the ‗R-connection‘, such that, according to it, we have one thing. 
There is disagreement over whether and to what extent the R-connection involves psychological 
continuity, or bodily continuity, or whatever, but the important point is that the R-connection 
consists of various facts concerning various states of the things (psychological, physiological, 
whatever) that hold at particular times, together with an appropriate causal connection between 
the facts concerning those states of the thing at those times. (We may also need to include the fact 
that there exists no other candidate for being that thing at a given time, otherwise it may be 
thought to be indeterminate which thing the thing is, if any, and so how many such things exist 
during this interval.
20
) 
Some might object that if the R-connection involves causation, then presentism cannot 
help itself to this strategy, since the causal relation here is itself transtemporal. But all that 
presentists need to deny is that causation is a genuine relation, and adopt a view of causation that 
does not rely on that assumption. This manoeuvre comes at no great cost, since many popular 
theories of causation do not treat causation as a genuine relation; both the regularity and 
counterfactual theories, for instance, express causal statements in terms of connectives not 
relations. So, if causation should be best thought of as a connection between facts rather than as a 
relation between events,
21
 presentism can unproblematically use the notion of the R-connection, 
                                                 
20
 Pace Bernard Williams. See, for instance, Parfit (1984) 
21
 See, for instance, Mellor (1995) 
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since no transtemporal relations are involved in it, and all the facts that are involved can be 
represented in the ersatz way.
22
 
What it is to be a single thing, then, supervenes on the R-connected facts. Or more 
accurately, in order to guarantee that we do not miscount the number of things, we should say it 
supervenes on what we may call ‗closed R-connected facts‘, where the facts are R-connected to 
each other and there is no other fact to which they are R-related. We can now use this to say what 
it takes for something to be different from something else. For the number of things that exist 
supervenes on the R-connected facts: one thing is different from another if the closed R-connected 
facts concerning one thing are different from the closed R-connected facts concerning the other. 
So to say that there are exactly two kings of England named Edgar is to say that there are two 
different lots of closed R-connected facts, F1, F2, concerning a king of England named Edgar, and 
every lot of closed R-connected facts concerning a king of England named Edgar is identical to 
either F1 or F2. 
An account of the difference relation required to solve the problem of numerical 
quantification within the sPan operator can be given, then, without invoking a genuine 
transtemporal relation, since it supervenes on the facts, i.e., what is represented as being the case 
according to the abstract structure. Presentism, then, survives. And it survives in a more 
transparent and satisfactory form than the version that takes (7a) as a primitive truth. Indeed, the 
complexity that we have seen is involved in (7a) is a strong reason to think that we do not have a 
primitive understanding of it. On the other side of the fence, those who take other times to be real 
may think that their account of (7a) is much less involved than the solution I have just sketched, 
and so preferable. But this would be a misleading impression of the situation. After all, in order 
for realists to quantify over the right sorts of thing, a story along the lines of closed R-connected 
facts is the best story to be told in any case, otherwise (7a) may well be true without there having 
been two kings of England named Edgar, since there is nothing to say that the variables do not 
just pick out various portions of a single object. There is not much to choose, then, between the 
ersatz view and the realist view in terms of the complexity of what needs to be in place to capture 
claims like (6); the only substantial difference is that realists invoke concrete facts as truthmakers, 
whereas presentists invoke abstract truthmakers. At this stage, then, the only ammunition that 
realists have against ersatzers is the problem familiar from the modal realism debate of 
accounting for how abstract objects manage to represent how things are. This general issue goes 
beyond the scope of our concerns here, but it is worth commenting that, even if we were 
ultimately left with some ‗magical‘ account of how representation is achieved, there would be a 
strong defensive strategy presentism could employ, namely that if the realists won‘t allow such 
accounts of representation, then they will be forced into an uncomfortable position in accounting 
for representation in the modal case, either by going to the one extreme of adopting the analogue 
of their view of time and endorsing genuine modal realism and concrete representations, or by 
going to the other end of the scale and adopting an unenlightening primitivism. But however this 
wider story pans out, I‘ve shown that presentism need not worry about the particular problem of 
numerical quantification across temporal intervals. 
 
                                                 
22
 See my (2006) for the details of this project to show how presentism deals with causation. 
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